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Abstract 
 
In this paper I present and analyze the communitarian theory of Michael 
Walzer regarding the difference between the spheres of social justice. From 
this theoretical perspective, Walzer argues that the distribution of citizenship 
should be open to those categories of foreigners, such as refugees or guest 
workers that inhabit the territory of a political community. I underline the 
fact that this theory of “potential citizenship” is not compatible with the 
communitarian theory mentioned above. In the final section of the paper I 
suggest that a solution for maintaining the potential citizenship thesis is to 
offer a weaker reading of the communitarian thesis, according to which the 
acceptance of some principles of distribution should be based on the fact that 
a justification would be available for the belief that those principles are likely 
to be the right ones.   
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The Spheres of Social Justice 
 
In his work, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and 
Equality, Michael Walzer argues in favor of the thesis that the 
essence of the idea of social justice is to distinguish between the 
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spheres of the distribution of social goods. This implies the 
existence of certain specific criteria of distribution for each 
sphere so that the distribution of the goods specific to a certain 
sphere does not directly influence the distribution in another 
sphere (Walzer 1983, 20). Thus, no social good will prevail, so 
that monopoly on it will not trigger illegitimate social 
dominance, or tyranny. 
A consequence of this position is that there are several 
lists of goods that are common to any human society. The goods 
do not have their own meaning, independent of the social 
context of their creation. All goods distributed within a society 
are social goods in the sense that they are created and 
marketed within certain social processes, and these processes 
and meanings may differ from one society to the next (Walzer 
1983, 7). That is why there is not only one just procedure of 
distribution, in Walzer’s opinion, but the procedures vary from 
one society to the other and even within the same society from 
one historical period to the other: therefore, a distribution is 
just when it occurs according to criteria resulting from the 
social meaning of the goods, as it is shared by the members of 
that society. 
This leads to another important consequence: 
distributive social justice can only be measured by reference to 
a given society, its members, the meanings they attribute to 
social goods and the distribution procedures in use. Beyond this 
framework, there can be no judgments generally valid in any 
society, at any time in history. 
 
Political Community and Membership 
 
Walzer’s idea of social justice implies a given society, a “limited 
world” which he calls “political community” and describes as “a 
group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing 
social goods, first of all among themselves” (Walzer 1983, 31). 
Consequently, an individual is entitled or not to participate in 
this process of distribution function of his belonging or not to 
the respective political community. 
Thus, the first good to be distributed and shared within 
a community is membership. How does one acquire META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (1) / 2011 
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membership? By one being accepted by those who are already 
members of the community in question. Walzer insists on the 
fact that acceptance will not be arbitrary and neither will it 
occur in the same way within any society and in relation to any 
category of outsiders: it depends on the way the members of 
that community understand the relationship with outsiders, 
and on the contacts, conventions, or alliances established 
outside the borders (Walzer 1983, 31). 
An important problem consists in the aspects regarding 
the status and integration in the political community of the 
outsiders who, for some reason, are included de facto in this 
community without enjoying full membership. The closed 
political community whose borders are absolutely impenetrable 
is just a theoretical construct; in reality, they are more or less 
permeable, allowing immigration or emigration. An important 
reason for this situation is also the asymmetry that exists 
between immigration and emigration. If a community has the 
right to impose conditions on the outsiders who wish to be part 
of it, it does not have the right to restrict the possibility that its 
own members choose to emigrate from it (Walzer 1983, 39). 
This means that, at any time, a society includes various 
categories of outsiders who are taken into account in the 
process of distribution of social goods. This poses the problem of 
social justice for each and every one of them.  
 
The Double Check Procedure 
 
In the case of the above-mentioned categories, Walzer argues 
that there is a double procedure of admittance within a 
community: first, we check that the conditions are met for 
admittance with a limited status of refugee, asylum seeker, 
guest worker etc., and secondly we check on “naturalization” or 
adherence as full member. 
In today’s society, for economic, political or other 
reasons, developed countries often have relatively permissive 
admittance procedures for the first stage but extremely 
restrictive for the second. The question arises whether this 
particular aspect is a source of social injustice against these 
categories. Walzer’s answer is affirmative, as he believes that Viorel Ţuţui / Between the “Spheres of Justice” and the “Right to Citizenship” 
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denying naturalization may result in a type of illegitimate 
dominance of the host state citizens and especially of the 
representatives thereof towards the foreigners who are forced to 
remain in a precarious status. He even compares this situation 
to tyranny (Walzer 1983, 59). 
Such dominance situations occur because the goods 
related with the sphere of distribution of political power 
influences another sphere illegitimately, for instance the 
economic sphere. Guest workers sign a contract which gives 
them a certain status, but their consent at a given moment can 
only legitimate transactions on the labor market, but cannot 
legitimate any form of political dominance, such as the absolute 
denial of their right to obtain citizenship or to own a home, or 
the permanent danger of expulsion, and so on. 
What can be done about this? In this thinker’s opinion, 
the answer lies in the connection that must exist between the 
two stages of the above-mentioned procedure. These categories 
of outsiders already admitted on a state’s territory must be 
considered “potential citizens” (Walzer 1983, 60). Therefore, all 
that a host state may impose is a list of conditions (of its choice) 
for citizenship, conditions which, if met, should be sufficient in 
this process. 
 
“The Simple Communitarian Dilemma” 
 
Walzer’s statement on the necessity that outsiders who have 
passed the first check-up in the above procedure qualify for 
naturalization is interesting and challenging. Unfortunately, 
such a generous principle on the status of this category of 
outsiders cannot be justified from its communitarian 
perspective. 
A series of important arguments in this sense come from 
Joshua Cohen. In his view, Walzer’s particularism and 
communitarianism are such that social justice depends on 
whether our current social arrangements match our common 
understandings on values. But people could accept the current 
institutional arrangements not only because they share the 
values these arrangements embody, but also because of other 
reasons such as fear, indifference, narrow-minded personal META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (1) / 2011 
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interest, ignorance of alternatives, strategic conduct, and so on. 
So, the phenomenon of conformity to certain practices does not 
guarantee a shared understanding on values (Cohen 1986, 462-
3). 
Besides, another problem is that Walzer identifies the 
values of a community through its practices. He does not accept 
a critical and philosophical perspective different from these 
practices to establish whether the practices themselves are 
reasonable. Then how can he justify a critical judgment such as, 
for instance, that current institutional arrangements on the 
distribution of certain goods should be changed? If we identify 
the values as different from practices, then what proof do we 
have that we have correctly interpreted the values of the 
community in question? Cohen calls this problem the “simple 
communitarian dilemma”. One possible solution might be to 
argue that only certain practices embody the shared values, but 
then we have a new problem in defining the principle by which 
we will select these practices (Cohen 1986, 464-6).  
 
Relativism and Moral Progress 
 
Defining the criterion of social justice in the values shared in a 
moral community also poses a significant problem in regard of 
the relations between different communities, or between 
different moments in the historical evolution of that 
community. To what extent can one assess these relations in 
terms of social justice or injustice? 
Walzer explicitly assumes the relativist view that 
judgments made within a community are different from those 
made within another community. All of them are legitimate and 
there is no possibility of ranking them all across (Walzer and 
Dworkin 1983, 2) However, an issue such as the status of the 
special categories of outsiders mentioned above seems to 
require precisely this type of judgments when we assess justice 
or injustice in the relations between foreigners and the citizens 
or the institutions of the host state. 
An even bigger problem is that, in Walzer’s view, we do 
not have any reason to support the moral superiority of a set of 
values or some institutional arrangements over others as long Viorel Ţuţui / Between the “Spheres of Justice” and the “Right to Citizenship” 
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as there is an autonomy of the “spheres of justice” and a 
distribution of goods in accordance with the shared 
understandings within that community. 
Therefore, Walzer’s model does not seem to allow 
ordinary forms of emancipation and moral progress within a 
society from one stage of its history to the next. Because the 
question arises: How can we justify the changes in the current 
practices since they reflect the values of that community? The 
only basis of the legitimacy of our set of values is the fact that 
they are ours. Thus, Walzer cannot go beyond the framework of 
his vision, which I would call “descriptivist” – since it asserts 
that to justify the values of a community only means to 
correctly identify them –, in order to uphold a conception of a 
normative sort which would enable us to judge the differences 
between the values specific to certain different communities, or 
to different stages in the history of the same community. 
But if we return to the “potential citizenship” thesis, we 
notice that it has just the character of a normative 
recommendation concerning the appropriate treatment of 
foreigners within the political communities typical of 
democratic states: to maintain the possibility that they obtain 
citizenship if they meet the stipulated conditions. But what 
happens if, in a political community, there is an exclusivist 
discriminatory attitude towards the granting of citizenship, 
that ignores this recommendation? Can Walzer maintain this 
recommendation in spite of the fact that the shared meanings 
inside that community prescribe something else? I believe that 
the answer should be negative if he wishes to be consistent with 
the thesis that the justification of the distribution principles 
lies only in the meaning of membership within that specific 
community. 
 
Suggestions on a Possible Solution 
 
As shown in the previous sections, it appears that Walzer must 
choose between this strict communitarian thesis and the 
generous doctrine of the “potential citizenship”. In my opinion, 
given the above-mentioned issues that affect the 
communitarian theory as well as the intuitive plausibility of the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (1) / 2011 
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potential citizenship doctrine, the solution might be to give up 
on the former thesis (or at least reformulate it) in favor of the 
latter. Of course, in this case, we must offer an alternative 
solution to the strict communitarian thesis on the issue of the 
disagreements within the same community and those 
appearing between the members of different communities. 
In order to outline this answer, I believe we must start 
by remarking that Walzer proposes too narrow a conception 
regarding the types of disagreements. Thus, in his reply to 
Ronald Dworkin’s article ‘Spheres of Justice’: An Exchange, he 
claims there are only two ways in which disagreements may 
occur: within the same cultural tradition, and between citizens 
belonging to radically different cultural traditions. In the 
former case, the conflict occurs because of the different 
interpretation of the meanings, or because of the different 
positions assumed in what concerns border-related disputes or 
the overlapping borders of the spheres corresponding to 
different goods. But these disputes do not deny the existence of 
shared goods, and rather confirm it. The disputes of the latter 
type arise between radically different societies or in divided 
societies, in which case there should be alternative types of 
distribution corresponding to these different understandings 
(Walzer and Dworkin 1983, 1). 
In my opinion, Walzer uses an argument similar to a 
false dilemma here, suggesting that there can only be these two 
types of disagreements. But there are also deeper 
disagreements within the same society, caused not only by 
different interpretations of some border issues, or pertaining to 
the fact that society is divided in several radically different 
cultural traditions. As Ronald Dworkin points out, we should 
not assume that the meanings in a society are either fully 
shared or different. A conception closer to reality seems to be 
that there can be both an agreement between the citizens of a 
political community at a certain abstract level of interpretation 
of the distribution principles, and a disagreement on some 
interpretation at a more concrete level. 
We notice that such divergences can exist between 
people of different political convictions. For example, a 
conservative may agree to limit citizenship to certain categories Viorel Ţuţui / Between the “Spheres of Justice” and the “Right to Citizenship” 
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of foreigners, and a liberal may ask for the same conditions to 
be imposed on all types of foreigners. But, if this is the case, 
these deeper disagreements within a society can no longer be 
sorted out through shared meanings for certain social goods 
since, according to the hypothesis, there are no such shared 
meanings concerning those social goods, although there may be 
some regarding other social goods. 
In this sense, in his article To each his own, Ronald 
Dworkin points out that the social meanings are not in fact 
shared completely, but disputed and challenged all the time. In 
order to solve these disagreements, we have to transcend our 
traditions and understanding, and resort to general principles 
(Dworkin 1983, 1-2).  
             In  his  replying  article,  ‘Spheres of Justice’: An 
Exchange, Walzer remarks that, even when such a solution 
could be provided – which he finds doubtful – it too would be 
contested permanently. Therefore, it seems to him that the only 
acceptable option is the strict communitarian thesis according 
to which disagreements can be solved only on the basis of the 
shared meanings of social goods (Walzer and Dworkin 1983, 1). 
I believe that, with this response, all Walzer does is 
reaffirm the above mentioned false dilemma in a new form: 
social meanings are either shared all the way, or challenged 
completely. This means either that the disagreement does not 
exist, or that it is insurmountable. In my opinion, the false 
dilemma is caused by a misunderstanding on what both the 
agreement and the disagreement mean. Both the agreement 
and the disagreement are not spontaneously recognized without 
a justification of their acknowledgement. There must be some 
kind of argumentation regarding the fact that the principles are 
accepted by all, not because they are specific to that 
community, but because all the members of the community 
perceive them to be the right ones. Therefore, as Ronald 
Dworkin points out, it is necessary that the reason why we 
accept certain principles to govern the distribution of certain 
goods be that the respective principles are the right ones to us, 
and not the fact that they correspond to a conventional practice 
(Walzer and Dworkin 1983, 3). META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (1) / 2011 
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But one could ask: is there such a process of 
argumentation within a pluralist society? Moreover, would not 
this idea force us to completely reject any communitarian 
assumption according to which there are certain shared 
meanings and values? I believe the answer to the first question 
can be affirmative and the answer to the second can be negative 
as long as we have a refined interpretation for both the idea of 
argumentation, and for the communitarian thesis. 
Therefore, first of all, we should be aware of the fact that 
any argumentation can only occur under the circumstances of a 
previous minimal agreement. It is no longer possible when the 
disagreement reaches too deep. Neither does the argumentation 
occur when the agreement is unconditional or natural. For 
instance, the agreement on a distribution principle should occur 
only because the members of the community have reasons to 
believe that the respective principle meets certain conditions 
indicating its correctness. And the disagreement on whether 
the principle meets these conditions should be at least possible, 
even if it does not always occur. Consequently, the agreement 
on a distribution principle among the members of a community 
is always conditioned, and it is always possible that certain 
members of the community rightfully question it. 
Secondly, there is a weaker interpretation of the 
communitarian thesis matching our assumption of the 
distribution principles as described above. To begin with, we 
should emphasize, similarly to Walzer, that a political 
community does not have the characteristics of a family or of a 
club. Thus, if membership in a family is naturally acquired by 
birth and lost by death, membership in a political community 
can be acquired and lost conditionally, and in a more flexible 
way. But it is not distributed at a given time on some strictly 
exclusivist criteria or terms of value sharing, as in a club. 
Besides, a political community is a given historical reality 
comprising people with only partially superposing values.  
A political community is never divided between radically 
different cultural traditions, separated by absolute borders 
because, if it were so, it could not function. Instead, as Dworkin 
suggests, there are several levels at which we can manifest our 
agreement or disagreement so that certain citizens can be Viorel Ţuţui / Between the “Spheres of Justice” and the “Right to Citizenship” 
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associated with the same “tradition” up to a point, and with 
different “traditions” beyond that point. 
In my opinion, this view is more appropriate than the 
strictly communitarian thesis to solve the problems mentioned 
above. The agreement among the members of a community is 
not only descriptive, i.e., it does not only present a state of fact: 
that of some shared meanings on the social goods. But it is 
rather normative: it reflects a process of argumentation which 
justifies, for the members of that community, the idea that the 
selected distribution principles are correct. 
Also, this process of argumentation explains the 
possibility of social and moral progress within a community, as 
well as the possibility of certain comparisons and influences 
between distinct political communities, which helps us avoid 
the risk of relativism. 
To conclude, it is possible to combine the thesis of the 
existence of some autonomous spheres of social justice with no 
direct influences between them, and the thesis that the 
principles governing the distribution of social goods should be 
correlated with the meanings of those social goods within the 
community. But the process of establishing an agreement on 
the set of principles assumed by that community should not be 
seen as descriptive or interpretive, but rather as argumentative 
and normative. 
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